Perspectives on the early retirement decisions of farming couples by Väre, Minna & Heshmati, Almas
  
 
         MTT Economic Research 
        Discussion Papers 
         Number 2004:15 
 
Perspectives on the 
Early Retirement          
Decisions of Farming 
Couples 
 
Minna Väre  
Almas Heshmati 
  
September 2004 
 
Perspectives on the Early Retirement Decisions of Farming Couples 
 
Minna Väre1 & Almas Heshmati2 
 
 
1MTT Economic Research 
Agrifood Research Finland 
Luutnantintie 13, FIN-00410 Helsinki, Finland 
minna.vare@mtt.fi 
kyosti.pietola@mtt.fi 
 
2MTT Economic Research and 
Techno-Economic & Policy Program 
College of Engineering 
Seoul National University 
San 56-1, Shilim-dong, Kwanak-gu 
Seoul 151-742, Korea 
heshmati@snu.ac.kr 
 
 
 
Abstract. In the past decade, the European agricultural sector has undergone rapid structural 
change. Part of that change is manifested in extended early retirement plans. In studying 
farmers’ exit behaviour in different countries, institutional differences, incentive programs 
and constraints are found to matter. In Finland, farmers’ early retirement programs were first 
introduced in 1974 and, in recent years, it has been carried out within the European Union 
framework for these programmes. The early retirement benefits are farmer specific. As pen-
sions play a crucial role in determining the characteristics of structural change in agriculture, 
it is important to establish the factors which determine the exit from farming especially 
among elderly part-time farmers and how off-farm income and income losses affect their exit 
choices. This study analyses the choice of pension scheme of elderly farmers. The focus is on 
the effects of farm and off-farm incomes and various offered economic incentives on farmers’ 
retirement decisions. The results provide insights into how farmers’ off-farm income affects 
the type of exit decisions made by elderly farmers. These results provide valuable information 
concerning evaluation of programmes employed in the past, the existing programmes and the 
design of future retirement systems and policies that are financially viable. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
During the past ten years, the Finnish agricultural sector has undergone a rapid struc-
tural change. This has been manifested in significant changes in both the number and 
size of farms. The number of farms has decreased from 113,109 in 1990 to 63,179 in 
2003 and the average farm size has increased from 17.7 hectares to 31.0 hectares during 
the same period (Appendix 1 and Mela, 2004). At the same time, both farm income and 
its share of the farm family’s total income have been decreasing. In the year 2000, farm 
income contributed 39% of total farm family income. Wages and salaries from off-farm 
work and other entrepreneurial activities amounted to 35% of total farm family income. 
In 1990, the corresponding shares were 51% and 29% (Statistics Finland, 2000). As 
well as having an ever increasing importance for farm households, off-farm employ-
ment has also an increasing effect on farm household decisions. One of the most impor-
tant decisions during the farmer’s career is when the farmer is going to retire and what 
happens to the farm after that retirement. Thus, as off-farm work is becoming more and 
more common practice and a significant complement to farm incomes, it is crucial to 
know how off-farm income affects farmers’ retirement decisions.  
 
In previous studies, part-time farming has been found to both stabilise the farm house-
hold income and also accelerate farm exits by reducing transaction costs for those seek-
ing to leave agriculture (Goetz and Debertin, 2001). Because off-farm income stabilises 
the farm household (Kimhi and Bollman, 1999), for example, in cases of agricultural 
income variability and policy changes (Mishra and Goodwin, 1997), it can be seen as a 
stable long-run combination with farming rather than a step in the way out of agricul-
ture (Kimhi, 2000, p. 46). Part-time farming has, however, been found to promote the 
re-structuring of the farming sector (Pfeffer, 1989; Weiss, 1999). Part-time farmers have 
lower expectations for continuing farming both in the short- and long-run compared to 
full-time farmers (Pfeffer, 1989). Likewise, part-time farms have lower probabilities of 
survival and growth compared to full-time farms (Weiss, 1999). Also, on part-time 
farms, the probability of succession is found to be lower and the probability of other 
farm exits higher (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000). A farm may also be transferred to a 
successor earlier, if a farmer has off-farm work. This is a method which parents use to 
maximise family welfare (Kimhi, 1994). In summary, research indicates that off-farm 
income is financially important in smoothing the household income variability but it 
also negatively affects the productivity and profitability of farms, thereby reducing their 
survival rate. 
 
In studying farmers’ exit behaviour in different countries, institutional differences, fi-
nancial incentives and constraints are found to matter (Kimhi and Bollman 1999). In the 
European Union, farmers’ early retirement provisions are carried out according to the 
Rural Development Regulation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This regula-
tion aims to secure the income of retiring farmers and to improve the livelihood of 
farms with continuous operation. Because the early retirement system is voluntary, the 
procedures and practices of such measures applied in the member countries vary a lot. 
For example, in Ireland a successor does not have to purchase the farm from her/his 
parents or siblings but s/he has to provide a living for the previous generation from the 
farm income. This kind of commitment to financial responsibility to former owners is 
not the case, for example, in Finland. When comparing intergenerational transfers in 
different countries, Errington and Lobley (2002) came to the conclusion that the mana-
gerial responsibility for a farm is handed over earlier in France than in England. This is 
because France, unlike England, applies the early retirement and installation elements of 
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the Rural Development Regulation of the CAP. More details about retirement pro-
grammes and its practices in the context of EU-countries can be found for example in 
Blanc and Perrier-Cornet (1993). 
 
As types of occupational choices among elderly farmers play a crucial role in determin-
ing the characteristics of structural change in agriculture, it is important to establish 
what are the factors determining the type of exit from farming especially among elderly 
part-time farmers. Furthermore, it is important to find out how public policies, such as 
early retirement programmes foster these choices. By elderly farmers, we mean farmers 
who are sufficiently old to be eligible to have the option to voluntarily exit from farm-
ing using an offered pension benefit scheme. New information on the effects of off-farm 
work on the farming couple’s retirement behaviour is especially needed now, since the 
large so-called ‘baby-boom generation’ born in the late 1940s and early 1950s is ap-
proaching retirement age.  
 
This study analyses the choice of pension scheme of elderly farmers. The choice is stud-
ied by the use of qualitative methods. In the analysis, the farming couple’s exit deci-
sions are grouped into those who choose a farmers’ early retirement system and those 
selecting other pension schemes. Exits by the farmers’ early retirement system are fur-
ther characterised by two discrete occupational choices: exit and transfer of the farm to 
a new entrant, and exit and the closing down of the farm. Exits by other pension 
schemes are divided into involuntary exits (disability pension, etc.), old-age and other 
forms of pension, and the continuation of farming. 
 
The contribution of this paper to existing literature is that it analyses the impact of off-
farm income on a farming couple’s exit decisions. The farm transfer to a new entrant 
(farm succession) and farm closure are modelled as separate, mutually exclusive deci-
sions. Also, the farm and off-farm income and other economic incentives to promote or 
alternatively to discourage their retirement are considered in the analysis. Here, by eco-
nomic incentive, we mean the amount of income loss defined as the difference between 
agricultural and forestry incomes minus expected pension receipts. 
 
The results provide insights into how farmers’ off-farm income affects the type of exit 
decisions made by elderly farmers. These results provide valuable information concern-
ing evaluation of programmes employed in the past, the existing programmes and the 
design of future retirement systems and policies that are financially viable and aim at 
improving desirable structural adjustment to the agricultural sector. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in the following section, we introduce an 
early retirement plan in the context of the Finnish and European agriculture and its evo-
lution over time. The data are described in Section 3. The models used in the analysis 
are outlined in Section 4. In Section 5, the results are presented and discussed. The final 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. EARLY RETIREMENT POLICY 
 
In Finland, farmers’ early retirement programmes were first introduced in 1974. The 
aim of these programmes was to maintain the livelihood of family farms continuing 
production and thus improving the competitiveness in the agricultural sector. Since 
then, there have been several programmes of short duration that included: (i) change of 
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generation pension, (ii) farm closure compensation and (iii) early retirement aid to farm-
ers.  
 
The common lower age limit for all these programmes has been 55 years. This means, 
that farmers, aged between 55 and 64, who either ceased production of their farms by 
selling or leasing agricultural resources to neighbouring farms or transferred their farm 
to new entrants, received retirement benefits that they would have normally received at 
the age of 65. Retirement was also possible by reforestation of the land or by lay-land 
agreement. The early retirement benefits are farmer specific and they depend on the 
level of pension insurance the farmers have purchased over their active farming years 
(Mela, 2003). Since 1995, Finland has carried out farmers’ early retirement programmes 
within the EU framework for these programmes.  
 
During the last 30 years, over 67,000 farms have benefited from the farmers’ early re-
tirement programmes in Finland (Appendix 1). At the same time, number of farms and 
farm population insured by Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution (Mela) has decreased 
and average farm size increased. In practice, purchasing pension insurance from Mela 
has been obligatory for all farmers. It is also a pre-condition for applying for a farmer’s 
early retirement pension. The number of farmers exiting farming by means of the farm-
ers’ early retirement scheme per year was highest in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Ap-
pendix 2). In addition to making easy the survival and the transfer of farms financially 
possible, the programmes served as an active labour market measure during a period of 
increased unemployment. Switching job by farmers is a difficult task due to the mis-
match of skills and low mobility of farmers as a labour force. During recent years, the 
number of farms applying to the programme has been decreasing. 
 
In the European Union, regulations on enhancing farms to give up operation of farms 
were first introduced in 1988. Up to 1992, in practice, only Germany applied a farmers’ 
early retirement scheme based on these regulations. According to the scheme, a farmer, 
aged 58-64 years, received early retirement pension if s/he stopped cultivating her/his 
land, reforested it or sold it. In 1992, new regulations were introduced for farmers’ early 
retirement systems in the EU. The aim of these regulations was both to secure the in-
come of retiring farmers and to help replace them by other farmers more able to im-
prove the livelihood of continuing farms. The age limit for retiring farmers was lowered 
to 55 years. Being voluntary also, this system was applied in less than ten EU member 
states. In 1999, this second wave of regulation was replaced by the Community aid 
scheme for early retirement from farming included in the Rural Development Regula-
tion (EC Council Regulation 1257/1999). This aid scheme includes no more restrictions 
concerning full-time farming as was a pre-condition in the earlier schemes (HE, 
1992:194; 1994:162; and 1999:131). 
 
 
3. THE DATA  
 
3.1 Data description 
 
Data on farmers’ exit decisions and retirement choices were obtained from the Finnish 
Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution (Mela) and complemented by farmer income data 
and information on farmers’ household characteristics from Statistics Finland. The data 
are a good representation of the population of elderly farmers in Finland, since the pur-
chasing of pension insurance from Mela is obligatory for all farmers.  
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The data consists of a sample of 963 farms. The sample is a random selection of all 
farmers born between 1929 and 1943 and stratified after the farmer’s age corresponding 
to the share of all farmers at every age. All the farmers in the data set were active farm-
ers in 1993. The data set forms a balanced panel prior to the retirement and runs from 
the year 1993 to the year 1998. There is no information available on income post-
retirement. All farmers in the data set were eligible to the farmers’ early retirement 
scheme during the study period according to his/her age. The oldest farmer in the data 
was 64 years old in 1993 and youngest one was 55 years old in the final year 1998.  
 
The share of farmers with a spouse is 47% in the sample. The share of couples choosing 
farmers’ early retirement pension is much higher at 71%. There are 456 farms operated 
by couples. In the study, the older member of the farming couple is defined as the 
farmer and the younger as the spouse, since eligibility to the early retirement scheme is 
determined by the age of the older person in the couple. 
 
In this study, farms are divided according to the choice of pension scheme of the farmer 
and his/her spouse to different groups (Figure 1). The choice of pension scheme, farm 
transfer and continued farming are the dependent variables. First, farms are divided into 
two groups according to whether they choose the farmers’ early retirement system or 
not. Exits by the farmers’ early retirement system are further characterised by two dis-
crete occupational choices: exit and transfer of the farm to a new entrant, or exit and 
closing down the farm. Those farms not choosing the farmers’ early retirement scheme 
are further divided into those continuing to farm, and those using other pension schemes 
than pre-retirement. There are no farms where both the farmer and spouse exit involun-
tarily (e.g. due to death, disability pension, etc.). Out of the 963 sample farms, one fifth 
or 194 farms chose to retire within the frame of farmers’ early retirement pension. Out 
of these farms, more than one half is transferred to a new entrant. More than half of 
those farms not choosing the farmers’ early retirement scheme, 769 in total, continue 
farming and almost half of them chooses old-age or other pension systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of farms according to the choice of pension scheme. 
 
 
Descriptive statistics of the data characterising different groups of farms eligible to pen-
sion schemes, farm transfers and continuous operation are presented in Table 1. When 
comparing the differences between different groups, it seems that those farmers and 
spouses choosing the farmers’ early retirement system are older and have smaller dis-
Sample 
(5,778) 
Farm closure 
(516) 
Early retirement 
pension (1,164) 
 
Continue 
(2,322) 
Farm transfer 
(648) 
Old-age and other 
pension (2,292) 
 
Involuntary 
exit (0) 
 
No early retirement 
pension (4,614) 
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persion in the couple’s ages than those not choosing the farmers’ early retirement sys-
tem. Farms choosing the early retirement system also seem to more often be operated by 
a couple. Farmers choosing the early retirement system also have more children. On 
average, the oldest child is also older on these retiring farms than on other farms. Farms 
choosing an early retirement pension are also to some extent larger than other farms in 
the sample measured by the size of arable land and forest area. Farms choosing the early 
retirement system are also more often located in southern parts of the country and are 
specialised in other production activities than livestock. Because of having higher agri-
cultural income than other farms, the income loss is also bigger (as well as its dispersion 
among farms) when retiring by choosing the farmers’ early retirement system. These 
farms also have lower off-farm income (and smaller deviation among the farms) than 
other farms in the sample. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the Mela pension data, 1993-1998. 
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Part A. Early retirement pension, NT=5,7781     
Fage Farmer´s age, years 58.9  4.5 43.0 77.0 
Sage Spouse´s age, years 53.9  5.2 32.0 68.0 
Spouse Spouse (0.1) 0.47 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Ffarmage Farming years of farmer  28.6  10.2 1.0 59.0 
Children Number of children  2.3  1.7 0.0 17.0 
Childage Age of the oldest child, years  25.7  13.3 0.0 49.0 
Land Arable land area, ha  15.4  14.4 0.0 118.0 
Forest Forest area, ha 51.2 63.1 0.0 856.0 
Livestock Livestock and dairy farm (0.1) 0.33 0.5 0.0 1.0 
North North (0.1) 0.13 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Trend Trend (1993=1)  3.5  1.7 1.0 6.0 
Xreplace Income loss of early retire., euro2 2,748.6 8,064.7 0.0 109,353.0 
Xagrincome Agricultural income, euro 7,185.1 12,229.3 0.0 127,365.0 
Xoffincome Off-farm income, euro 3,105.5 8,247.1 0.0 111,424.0 
Sshare Share of subsidy3 0.9  14.6 0.0 962.4 
Part B. Farm transfer, NT=1,164     
Fage Farmer´s age, years 59.4  3.9 50.0 70.0 
Sage Spouse´s age, years  55.8  3.9 43.0 66.0 
Spouse Spouse (0.1) 0.71 0.46 0.0 1.0 
Ffarmage Farming years of farmer  30.5  8.4  4.0 53.0 
Children Number of children  2.6  1.9 0.0 17.0 
Childage Age of the oldest child, years  29.1  11.1 0.0 47.0 
Land Arable land area, ha  21.3  14.3 0.0 97.0 
Forest Forest area, ha 52.5 48.8 1.0 338.0 
Livestock Livestock and dairy farm (0.1) 0.28 0.45 0.0 1.0 
North North (0.1) 0.09 0.29 0.0 1.0 
Trend Trend (1993=1)  3.5  1.7 1.0 6.0 
Xreplace Income loss of early retire, euro2 3,789.1 11,260.8 0.0 109,353.0 
Xagrincome Agricultural income, euro 8,591.9 15,795.1 0.0 127,365.0 
Xoffincome Off-farm income, euro 1,372.1 5,410.9 0.0 48,648.0 
Sshare Share of subsidy3 0.3  2.2 0.0 60.3 
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Table 1 continues 
 
    
 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Part C. Continue farming, NT=4,614     
Fage Farmer´s age, years 58.9  4.7 43.0 77.0 
Sage Spouse´s age, years  53.1  5.4 32.0 68.0 
Spouse Spouse (0.1) 0.42 0.49 0.0 1.0 
Ffarmage Farming years of farmer  28.1  10.6 1.0 59.0 
Children Number of children  2.2  1.7 0.0 12.0 
Childage Age of the oldest child, years  24.9  13.7 0.0 59.0 
Land Arable land area, ha  13.9 14.0 0.0 118.0 
Forest Forest area, ha 50.9 66.2 0.0 856.0 
Livestock Livestock and dairy farm (0.1) 0.35 0.48 0.0 1.0 
North North (0.1) 0.14 0.34 0.0 1.0 
Trend Trend (1993=1)  3.5  1.7 1.0 6.0 
Xreplace Income loss of early retire., euro2 2,486.1 7,009.9 0.0 87,307.0 
Xagrincome Agricultural income, euro 6,831.2 11,125.1 0.0 95,838.0 
Xoffincome Off-farm income, euro 3,542.8 8,766.2 0.0 111,424.0 
Sshare Share of subsidy3 1.0  16.3 0.0 962.4 
1) The number of farms, periods and observations is 963, 6 and 5,778, respectively. 
2) Agricultural income minus expected early retirement pension (per farm). 
3) (Subsidy for barley per hectare * land size)/agricultural income per farm 
 
 
3.2 The variable definitions 
 
The explanatory variables included in the analysis were defined after the earlier studies 
on labour force transition and on farmers’ exit decisions. According to Kerkhofs et al. 
(1999), ‘financial incentives are the most important factors determining the choice to 
apply for an early retirement scheme’. Kerkhofs et al. (1999) have also found that when 
making retirement decision, income streams in alternative exit routes are compared and 
that different alternative exit routes serve as substitutes. Also, Pietola et al. (2003) 
found that higher retirement benefits increase the probability of both farm succession 
and farm closure.  
 
In this study, the economic incentive to retire is measured as an income loss of farmer 
and spouse when retiring using the farmers’ early retirement schemes. The income loss 
is measured as the difference between agricultural and forestry incomes before retire-
ment and the expected pension benefit when retired. Income loss is measured annually 
for both farmer and spouse individually and the aggregate for the farm. The two retire-
ment incomes are complements and in pooled form satisfy better an expected retirement 
income level. In pension studies, replacement ratios (ratio between expected pension 
and income before retiring) are often used when modelling withdrawal from the labour 
market because it is believed that it is the ratio of the expected pension benefit and ex-
pected wages that matters rather than the income levels (Hakola, 2003). In this study, 
however, income loss when retiring is used. The ratio accounts for individual levels of 
income but ignores the between farm differences in levels, while income loss quantifies 
the individual losses but ignores the income levels. The income loss is on the average 
38.2% of agricultural income with very large dispersion. It is much higher for farm 
transfer than those continued farming. 
 
It has been found that on part-time farms, the probability of succession is lower and 
probability of other forms of farm exits is higher (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000). As such, 
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in this study, off-farm income is used as an explanatory variable in the analysis to reflect 
higher propensity to exit farming. The sample average is 43% of agricultural income 
with large dispersion. It is higher for groups of farms with continued operation com-
pared to those transferring the farm.  
 
There is evidence that the probability of transferring the farm to a new entrant first in-
creases with the farmer’s age and then beyond a certain age limit it decreases (Kimhi 
and Bollman, 1999; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Kimhi and Nachalieli, 2001). This is 
especially the case in family successions. On the contrary, the probability of other forms 
of exits is found to increase with a farmer’s age (Kimhi, 1994; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 
2000; Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001; Pietola et al., 2003). In this study, both the age of 
farmer and spouse and the number of years a farmer has been farming are included in 
the analysis as explanatory variables. The farmer is in average 5 years older than the 
spouse. The age at transfer is higher than at continuity of operation. The same applies to 
the years of farming. 
 
It has also been found that the larger the farm, the more likely the succession is and less 
likely the farm closure (Gasson et al., 1988; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Kimhi and 
Nachlieli, 2001; Glauben et al., 2002; Hennessy, 2002; Pietola et al., 2003). To capture 
the effects of size, in this study, the size of farm is measured by the size of farmland and 
forestland both measured in hectares. We do not see much difference in the size of for-
est land. However, the size of arable land differs among the two groups and it is 53% 
higher for the transfer category compared to farms with continued farming. 
 
Except that the farm size increases succession probability, the effect can also be con-
trary. Potter and Lobley (1992) have found that farmers without a successor do not have 
the motivation to expand their farms but tend to reduce their working hours (shadow 
effect). The number of children living on a farm on the other hand, has been found to 
increase succession probability (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Glauben et al., 2002). In 
this study, existence and number of children and the age of the oldest child are included 
as explanatory variables in the analysis. The average number of children per farm is 2.3 
and the age of the oldest child is on average 25.7 years. These numbers are somewhat 
higher among the transfer farms. 
 
Also the existence of a spouse in the household has been used as an explanatory vari-
able in earlier studies. Pietola et al. (2003) suggest that a farmer is expected to retire 
earlier if s/he has a spouse. In this study, the existence of a spouse is included as a 
dummy variable in the analysis.  
 
The farm’s regional location and production line may also significantly influence the 
timing of a farmer’s retirement. In this study, farms are divided according to their pro-
duction line into livestock farms (dairy, cattle, pig, poultry, sheep, goat and horse farms) 
and other mainly crop farms (crop and other plant production farms). In addition, farms 
are divided according to their location to those located in Northern and those located in 
Southern parts of the country. The division is made according to the EU-subsidy areas 
in Finland so that northern area includes areas classified as C2, C3 and C4. 
 
In addition, in order to capture the effect of subsidies, a variable labelled as ‘Sshare’ is 
formed by multiplying the area subsidy for barley per hectare by the farm’s land area 
and dividing the sum by agricultural income per farm. The new variable is included in 
the analysis simply because farms in northern and southern parts of the country differ 
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by land and forest area from each other. The share is quite small and the value is lower 
for transfer farms. Interaction variables such as ‘South-land’ and ‘North-forest’ are ob-
tained by multiplying land area and forest area by dummy variables indicating north and 
south, with south being opposite to north. Variable ‘Trend’ is defined so, that in the year 
1993 it gets the value 1 and in the final year 1998 it gets the value 6.  
 
Correlation between dependent and independent variables is shown at Table 2. As ex-
pected, pension is positively correlated (0.708) with transfer of farm and negatively cor-
related (-0.412) with continuity of operation. None of the dependent and independent 
variables is highly correlated with each other. The correlation coefficients between the 
two sets of variables lie in the interval between -0.346 and +0.362. Among the explana-
tory variables, we find that agricultural income of the farm (Xagrincome) is correlated 
with land (0.447) and with the income loss of the couple when retired (Xreplace) with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.944. This is reasonable since income loss is higher the big-
ger the agricultural income is, though the expected pension depends also on agricultural 
income. Remaining correlation coefficients are quite low and in the interval between -
0.258 and 0.303. With the exception of income and income loss variables, there is no 
indication of multicollinearity being a major problem. 
 
Table 2. Correlation matrix, NT=5,778 observations. 
 
 Independent variables Dependent  
variables 
 Fage Sage Children Land Forest Xre-
place 
Xagri-
income 
Xoff-
income 
Sshare Xpen-
sion 
Xtrans. 
Sage 0.009 d           
Children 0.019 d 0.129a          
Land -0.065a 0.237a 0.053a         
Forest 0.003 d 0.029b 0.089a 0.030b        
Xreplace -0.104a -0.015a 0.059a 0.303a 0.039a       
Xagrincome -0.145a 0.259a 0.092a 0.447a 0.068a 0.944a      
Xoffincome -0.258a 0.056a 0.021 d 0.016d -0.070a 0.029a 0.037a     
Sshare  -0.004 d 0.006 d  -0.001d 0.022d -0.015d -0.022d  -0.025d 0.022d    
Xpension 0.041a 0.256a 0.085a 0.207a 0.010d -0.044a 0.058a -0.106a -0.019d   
Xtransfer 0.038a 0.180a 0.152a 0.232a 0.049a  -0.088d 0.006d -0.089a -0.019d 0.708a  
Xcontinue -0.346a 0.362a  -0.005d 0.062a 0.026c 0.069a 0.167a 0.229a 0.025d -0.412a -0.291a 
Note: Significant at the less than 1% (a), 1-5% (b), 5-10% (c), and more than 10% (d) levels insignificant.  
 
Glossary of variables: The choice of early retirement or not (Xpension), the farmer has 
chosen early retirement and transfers the farm to a new entrant or not (Xtransfer), 
farmer has not chosen early retirement and either continue farming or chose an old age 
pension (Xcontinue). 
 
 
4. THE MODELS AND METHODS 
 
The issues studied here deal with farmers’ exit decisions and their choice of exit chan-
nel. Earlier studies on farmers’ exit decisions have used e.g. logit (Kimhi, 2000; Stigl-
bauer and Weiss, 2000), probit (Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001) 
or bivariate probit models (Glauben et al., 2002). Both probit and logit models can han-
dle situations with single as well as multiple ordered or non-ordered choices and are 
estimated by maximum likelihood method. They assume, however, different distribu-
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tions in the error term, normal and logistic, respectively. The choice is made based on 
how well each describes variations in the data.  
 
In this study, five probit models including three univariate and two bivariate probit 
models are estimated. The univariate probit models are used to analyse issues of: (i) a 
farmers choice of early retirement versus no early retirement, (ii) the transfer or close 
down of the farm given early retirement chosen, and (iii) continued farming or old-age 
pension given no early retirement chosen. The last two choices are conditional, while 
the first one is not. Since there are no farms exiting involuntarily, the non-early retire-
ment choice is also modelled with binary probit model. However, non-early retirement 
exit alternatives are beyond the scope of this paper. The two bivariate probit models are 
formulated to analyse: (iv) early retirement and farm transfer to the next generation, and 
(v) no early retirement system and continued farming.1  
 
For a complete schematic picture of the set of exit choices see Figure 1. The bivariate 
probit model has the advantage that it accounts for selectivity in analysis of two simul-
taneous decisions. The choice of univariate or bivariate probit model is testable. A pri-
ori, we find it appropriate and beneficial to use bivariate models for analysis of early 
retirement and follow up of sample farms.  
 
4.1 Univariate probit analysis 
 
In the probit model, a discrete choice among two possibilities will be described by the 
latent dependent variable y. Probit model follows normal distribution (Maddala 1983):  
 
(1) iii xy εβα ++= '*  
 
where the residual term is normally distributed as εi ~ (0, σ2). In the model, observed 
dependent variable y will get two values: 
 
(2)  
otherwise0
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In the first case, (i) y gets the value 1 if the farmer is retiring by farmers’ early retire-
ment pension and zero if not. In the second case, (ii) y=1 if the farm is transferred to 
successor and y=0 if the farm is closed given the early retirement pension being chosen. 
In the third case, (iii) of continued farming y=1 if the farming couple continues to oper-
ate and y=0 if the farming couple retires with an old age or some other form of pensions 
given no early retirement pension is chosen. Modelling will be done separately for these 
three choices. 
                                                          
1
  Recently new methods have been developed to study a sequence of decisions made using multilevel 
probit models (e.g. Renard et al. 2004). In comparison with a traditional unilevel probit model, the 
multilevel model has the advantage that it accounts for the interrelationship between the sequences of 
decisions by conditioning on earlier stages. However, in the latter case, gains are achieved at the cost 
of complexity of the model structure, estimation procedures, diagnosis and, not least, interpretation of 
the results. We find the use of bivariate probit model sufficient method of analysis of early retirement 
here.  
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The analysis probability of y = 1 depends on a vector of independent variables labelled 
as x. The probability of P(y=1) increases with β’x. Thus, assuming that σ 2 =1, we get: 
 
(3)  
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where Φ = cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution with normalised 
variance.  
 
4.1 Bivariate probit analysis 
 
Next, two bivariate probit models are estimated to analyse the dependency of two pos-
sibly interdependent alternative choices. This method is used in evaluation of the effects 
of programme participation to isolate the programme effects. The priors here are that 
intergenerational transformation of farms might affect the retirement decision, and a 
continued farming excluding retirement options. 
 
The economic models have two choice variables and decision rules to be estimated. The 
first choice variable (y1) is the farmer statement whether s/he is or s/he is not choosing 
farmers early retirement system. The second choice variable (y2) is in the first model 
(iv) transfer of the farm to a new entrant or close it down, and in the second model (v) 
continued farming over choosing other pension scheme. The model has a recursive 
structure so that the farmer is hypothesised to first choose the farmers’ early retirement 
system or not, and then in the first model transferring the farm to a new entrant and in 
the second model continuing to farm. Therefore, choosing early retirement or not (y1) 
enters as an endogenous explanatory variable in the equations for the farm transfer and 
continuing to farm (y2). The system of two equations is written as:  
 
(4)  
2*222*2
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where the superscript i refers to farmer i and an asterisk (*) refers to the uncensored 
latent form, which is unobserved. The matrices x1 and x2 include exogenous instru-
ments, such as farmer and farm characteristics. The unknown parameters to be esti-
mated, as denoted by β1 and β2 and the error ε=(
 
ε1 ,ε2 ), are normally distributed with 
mean zero and the variance covariance matrix Σ. That is to say ε~N(0,Σ). The parameter 
γ indicates the effects of the first decision of early retirement on the second decision of 
transfer or continued farming. It is used to test the choice of univariate or bivariate for-
mulation of the choices. As standard in probit models, the model parameters are identi-
fied by normalising the variance of the errors at 1. Under this normalisation, the vari-
ance covariance matrix takes the form: 
 
(5) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
=Σ
1
1
ρ
ρ
 
 
where ρ=Cov(ε1 ,ε2). The latent form decision variables are censored such that: 
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In other words, in the first model, if the farmers’ early retirement pension is chosen, the 
binary indicator measuring the choice of the farmers’ early retirement system (y1) equals 
to one and otherwise to zero. Similarly, if the farm is transferred to a successor the 
choice variable (y2) takes value one and, if it is closed, it takes the value zero.  
 
The parameters in the two, possibly correlated, censored choice equations are estimated 
by a binomial probit model using the standard maximum likelihood method. The struc-
ture of the choice probabilities and the log-likelihood function can be found, for exam-
ple, in Greene (1998).  
 
 
5. THE RESULTS 
 
5.1 Model specification, estimation and performance 
 
An analysis of farmers’ decisions in response to the proposed pre-retirement pension 
plans, as described previously, is first made by three different univariate probit models 
of retirement, transfer and continuity and then by two bivariate probit models of early 
retirement-transfer and non-early retirement-continuous operation. Parameter estimates 
for three univariate separate probit models are shown in Table 3 and those of bivariate 
models in Table 5. The predicted probabilities of the two sets of models are reported in 
Tables 4 and 6, respectively.  
 
Variables included in the analysis are selected with reference to the practice by the ex-
isting literature, according to the data availability and the a priori expectations of the 
factor influences. Thus, for example, income loss when retiring by the early retirement 
scheme is included in the probit model of choosing the early retirement system but not 
in the probit model of continuing to farm given no early retirement system is chosen. In 
addition, some limited interaction terms of variables will be formed to capture their 
joint effect on farmers’ decisions. Statistical significance of the estimated individual and 
sets of coefficients is tested by t-test and likelihood ratio test, respectively. 
 
The data are a balanced panel data set. Estimated univariate probit and bivariate probit 
models are mainly based on cross-sectional information in the choice variable but year-
to-year changes in the variables explaining the choices are accounted for. This means, in 
the estimation that no attention is paid to which year farming couple retires, but on 
whether they retire in the first place and in what way. Farms in the data set differ from 
each other by land and forest area, location and production line. Thus, they form a het-
erogeneous group. The heterogeneity is accounted for by using relevant covariates.  
 
Results suggest that the estimated probit model coefficients are jointly statistically sig-
nificant at any conventional levels of significance, as measured by the likelihood ratio 
test. Here the test is based on log likelihood obtained from the unrestricted models 
specified as reported on Tables 3 and 5 and those restricted where all or subsets of the 
slope coefficients are assumed to be zero. The test results rejected the restricted models 
in favour of the unrestricted model specifications. 
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The three probit models correctly predict 19.1% - 97.1% of all observations (see Table 
4). The Table shows that 20.1% of the farmers choose pre-retirement pension. The pen-
sion model is performing worse compared to the transfer and continuous operation 
models. Whereas 97.1% of non-pension and 19.1% of pension cases are classified cor-
rectly, the percentages of incorrect cases are 2.9% and 80.9%, respectively.  
 
Given that the pension is chosen, a total of 55.7% selected intergenerational transfer. 
Unlike the pension model described above, the transfer model is performing better by 
correct prediction rates of 69.2% non-transfer and 83.0% of transfer cases. The relative 
performance in prediction of transfer versus non-transfer is thereby higher. The percent-
age of incorrect predictions is 30.8% and 17.0%.  
 
For farmers choosing not to pre-retire, 50.3% of the farmers choose to continue opera-
tion of their farms, while other gradually select old-age pensions. The relative high per-
formance of the model suggests that the model specification is adequate in explaining 
the variations in propensity to continue operation of the farms. The percentage of cor-
rectly predicted old-age pensions and continued operations are 88.0% and 78.3%, while 
the remaining 12.0% and 22.7% are incorrectly predicted.  
 
The estimated bivariate model for choosing early retirement and transferring the farm to 
a new entrant (20.1%) given the early retirement chosen overestimates the probability of 
not transferring the farm to a new entrant (79.9%) and underestimates the probability of 
transferring (11.2%) or closing the farm down (Table 6). The estimated bivariate model 
for not choosing the farmers’ early retirement system and continuing to farm underesti-
mates the probability of not continue farming (20.1%). It also underestimates the prob-
ability of continued farming (40.2%). The observed and predicted probabilities of dif-
ferent stages are given in Table 6. 
 
It is to be noted that in some cases the low correct prediction performance of such mod-
els is not an exception. Unlike in a production function with strong link between output 
produced and inputs used, there is no such one to one strong link between the choice of 
retirement and determinants of the choice. The researchers’ access to and ability to iden-
tify relevance covariates is crucial to the specification and performance of the models. 
Given the rich Mela data with its high quality used in current study we find the model 
specification and performance satisfactory in the evaluation of early retirement schemes 
in Finland.  
 
5.2 Univariate probit results 
 
A. Early retirement 
 
The parameter estimates of the early retirement model (Model 1 on Table 3) are with the 
exception of the barley subsidy share of farm income, the farmer’s age and forest land 
significantly different from zero at the less than 5% level of significance. The forest 
area and the farmer’s age are weakly significant. One of the most significant factors 
affecting the farmers’ choice of early retirement pension is the age of the spouse. The 
older the spouse, the higher the probability of farm transfer is to a successor or closing 
down the farm by selecting early retirement pension. To the  contrary, a high age of 
farmer decreases the probability of early retirement. This implies that the optimality of 
early retirement age is a decreasing function of the age of the farmer but an increasing 
function of the age of the spouse. The degree of inoptimality might be due to the profit-
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ability of a farm, good health condition or absent of transfer possibilities, non-monetary 
valuation of a farm and employment opportunities. The negative association between 
early retirement and age of the farmer is consistent with earlier findings by Kimhi and 
Bollman (1999), Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000), Kimhi and Nachalieli (2001) and Pietola 
et al. (2003). These found that the probability of transferring farm to a new entrant in-
creases first by the farmer’s age but the effect reverses after a certain age.  
 
Among other factors affecting positively the probability of selection of an early retire-
ment pension are: the length of time that the farmer has been operating the farm, the 
number of children as a proxy for potential successors, as well as the size of land. The 
size of arable land is a pre-condition for farm transfer, investment opportunities, expan-
sion, survival and profitability of farm. The loss of income following pre-retirement is 
unexpectedly positive. This might be due to the fact that farmers owning productive and 
profitable farms select early retirement with a higher probability to take advantage of 
the generous retirement offers as a measure to an advanced intergenerational transfer of 
the farm. 
 
Unlike arable land, forest land is negatively correlated with the probability of early re-
tirement. The same is true with farms located in the North. Farms in the North are very 
likely small and with limited potential to develop or being profitable to be transferred to 
successors. Although, the interaction of forest land and a northern location is found to 
be positively related to the probability of early retirement, while interaction of arable 
land and a southern location negatively affecting the probability of early retirement. An 
inclusion of these interaction effects is highly motivated but the estimated effects are 
unexpected, the reason of which is not known to us.  
 
The probability of early retirement decreases if the farm is a livestock farm. These 
farms are more capital and labour intensive, a transfer of which requires higher skill and 
heavy investment resources. The size of land is another constraint on expansion possi-
bilities at such farms. Income loss when choosing an early retirement pension measured 
as a difference between farm income and expected pension payments increases the 
probability to choose an early retirement pension. In line with earlier research, we ex-
pected a negative relationship. As a matter of sensitivity analysis, we estimated the 
same model specification but by excluding the income loss variable. The exclusion of 
income loss did not have any significant effect on the performance of the model in 
terms of correctly predicted probabilities and did not affect the remaining coefficients 
concerning changed signs2. Overall farm income, off-farm income and barley subsidy as 
shares of farm income, each decreases the probability of early retirement. Farm income 
bears an influence also on the level of the farmer’s pension when retiring. The trend in 
frequency of early retirement is negative reflecting a positive response by the farmer at 
the early stage of its introduction.  
 
In summary, our result is in agreement with earlier findings that after first increasing, 
the probability of retiring by the farmer’s early retirement scheme decreases by the 
farmer’s age. The larger the farm and the longer period the farmer has been farming, the 
more likely early retirement is. Positive associations are a reflection of the desire to 
minimise income losses following early retirement and to facilitate the transfer of the 
farm to the next generation. Early retirement is less likely in the northern parts of coun-
try and on livestock farms. 
                                                          
2
  These results are not reported here due to limitations of space. Results not reported here can, however, 
be obtained from the authors upon request.  
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B. Intergenerational transfer of farms 
 
The parameter estimates for farm transfer model are with the exception of the farmer’s 
age, years of farming and livestock as a production line significantly different from zero 
at the less than 5% level of significance (Model 2 on Table 3). When choosing the farm-
ers’ early retirement pension, agricultural and forest land are found to be the most sig-
nificant factors increasing the probability to transfer the farm to a successor. The result 
is in agreement with earlier findings, of among others, Gasson et al. (1988), Stiglbauer 
and Weiss (2000), and Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) who found that the larger the farm, 
the more likely succession and the less likely farm closure is.  
 
The older the oldest child is and the more children the farming couple has, the more 
likely a farm succession is to take place. The positive relation between succession and 
farm children is obvious. Without a potential successor, a succession is hardly going to 
take place, even though an early retirement system does not make any difference be-
tween family and non-family successors. Also, Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) and 
Glauben et al. (2002) have found that the number of children living on a farm increases 
the succession probability. 
 
Unlike the probability of choosing an early retirement pension, the farm succession 
probability increases with the increasing age of the farmer and decreases by the increas-
ing age of the spouse. This result is not expected. Succession probability also increases 
the longer the farmer has been farming. Unlike choosing an early retirement pension, 
the probability of farm succession is more likely if the farm is a livestock farm. This 
may be due to more intensive livestock production and thus better livelihood and em-
ployment possibilities compared to other non-livestock farms. 
 
The most significant factor decreasing the probability of farm succession among farm-
ers choosing an early retirement pension is the farm income. Succession probability also 
gets smaller the bigger the share of barley subsidy of farm income is. Off-farm income, 
on the other hand, increases the farm succession probability. This contradicts to the ear-
lier findings of Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) that part-time farming decreases the suc-
cession probability and increases the probability of other types of farm exits. One ex-
planation for the significant contribution on succession may be past revenue shocks. 
Off-farm income has been earlier found to stabilise farm household income in case of 
income variability (Kimhi and Bollman, 1999; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997) 
 
A northern location decreases the probability of transferring the farm to a new entrant. 
In other words, besides that the probability of choosing an early retirement pension be-
ing smaller in northern parts of the country, those farmers choosing retirement will 
more likely close down the farm. The probability of farm succession decreases over 
time. This is consistent with the general development of the structure of farming. The 
same is true when looking at the probability of choosing farmers’ early retirement pen-
sions. 
 
In summary, similar to previous studies, the larger the farm and the older children of the 
farming couple, the more likely a farm succession is. In northern parts of the country, 
succession is less likely and farmers choosing early retirement tend more often to sell 
than close the farm operation.  
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C. Continued operation of farms 
 
The parameter estimates for the model of farms continuing operation differ significantly 
from zero at the less than 5% level of significance. The exceptions are the number of 
children, age of the oldest child, agricultural land, dummy variable for livestock farm 
and share of barley subsidy of farm income (Model 3 on Table 3).  
 
Where the farmers’ early retirement pension is not chosen, the most significant factors 
determining whether the farmer or the spouse continue to farm or not, are the age of the 
farmer and the spouse (Model 3 on Table 3). The older the farming couple is, and the 
longer the farmer has been farming, the more likely the farming couple will stop farm-
ing. On the other hand, the existence of a spouse increases the probability of continuing 
to farm. This is because in this study, the older of the spouses regardless of gender is 
defined as a farmer.  
 
An increase in the age of the oldest child decreases the probability of continuing to 
farm. This is due to the increased propensity for farm successions in cases of not select-
ing farmers’ early retirement schemes. Also, in northern parts of the country, farmers 
are less likely to continue farming. This is consistent with the earlier findings, since 
both choosing the farmers’ early retirement pension and having farm succession were 
less likely in northern parts of the country. These findings suggest that farming is less 
likely to be continued in the northern part of the country. 
 
The larger the farm measured by agricultural land and forest area, the more likely the 
farming couple will continue to farm. Also, the bigger the agricultural and off-farm in-
come, the less likely they will retire. The probability of continuing to farm is a positive 
function of the number of children, if the farm is one of livestock. The probability of 
continuing to farm increases according to the share of the barley subsidy of farm in-
come, as well as over time.  
 
In summary, the older the farming couple are, and the longer the farmer has been farm-
ing the more likely they will choose some pension scheme. Also, the increasing age of 
the possible successor increases retirement probability. In northern parts of the country, 
farmers are less likely to continue farming. 
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Table 3. Parameter estimates of estimated three probit models. 
 
 Early retirement Farm transfer Continue 
 pension  farming 
Independent variable Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
    
Constant  -0.7439 b  -0.8001 d 8.2453 a 
Fage  -0.0083 c 0.0038 d  -0.1678 a 
Sage 0.0143 a  -0.0054 a  -0.1815 a 
Spouse  -  - 12.6345 a 
Ffarmage 0.0111 a 0.0004 d  -0.0077 a 
Children 0.0501 a  0.1738 a 0.0067 d 
Childage  - 0.0318 a  -0.0030 d 
Land 0.0457 a 0.0257 a 0.0024 d 
Forest  -0.0007 c 0.0072 a 0.0008 b 
Livestock  -0.2239 a 0.0635 d 0.0751 d 
North  -0.6254 a  -0.6902 a  -0.2588 a 
Trend  -0.0777 a  -0.2119 a 0.2451 a 
Xreplace, log 0.0296 a  -  - 
Xagrincome, log  -0.0709 a  -0.1362 a 0.0268 a 
Xoffincome, log  -0.0353 a 0.0305 b 0.0169 b 
Sshare  -0.0089 d  -0.1852 a 0.0008 d 
Southland  -0.0299 a  -  - 
Northforest 0.0019 b  -  - 
        
    
Log-likelihood  -2,472.087  -576.277  -1,511.967 
Restricted log-likelihood  -2,902.932  -799.323  -3,198.084 
Likelihood ratio test (DF) 861.689 446.091  3,372.233 
Degrees of freedom 15 13 15 
Number of 0/1 observations 4,614/1,164 516/648 2,292/2322 
Total number of observations 5,778 1,164 4,614 
Note: Significant at the less than 1% (a), 1-5% (b), 5-10% (c), and more than 10% (d) levels insignificant. 
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Table 4. Predicted (column) and observed (row) probabilities based on the 
univariate probit models. 
 
  0  1  Total 
  N % N % N % 
Early retirement pension     
0 4,481 97.1 133 37.7 4,614 79.9 
1 942  17.4 222  19.1 1,164  20.1 
Total 5,423 82.6 355 62.5 5,778 100.0 
Farm transfer     
0 357 69.2 159  23.1 516 44.3 
1 118  24.8 530 81.8 648 55.7 
Total 475 75.2 689 76.9 1164 100.0 
Continue farming     
0 2,018 88.1 274  13.1 2,292 49.7 
1 505 20.0 1817 78.3 2,322 50.3 
Total 2,523 79.9 2,091 83.1 4,614 100.0 
 
Note: Observed column / Predicted row percentages. 
 
 
5.3 Bivariate probit results 
 
Next, two bivariate probit models are estimated in order to analyse the dependency of 
choosing the farmers’ early retirement system and transferring the farm to the next gen-
eration and the dependency of not choosing the farmers’ early retirement system and 
continuing to farm. Results of these two bivariate probit models are shown in Table 5 
and their predicted probabilities in Table 6.  
 
A. Early retirement – farm transfer model 
 
The likelihood of transferring the farm to next generation is higher than the likelihood 
of closing down the farm on those farms choosing the farmers’ early retirement pension. 
The estimated correlation coefficient (ρ=0.989) is positive and significantly different 
from zero at the 1% or smaller level, indicating that there is a dependency between these 
two decisions. This implies that the two successive decisions are to be estimated jointly.  
 
Most of the parameter estimates for the early retirement and farm transfer model re-
ported in Table 5 are significantly different from zero at the less than 5% level of sig-
nificance. The forest area and share of barley subsidy of agricultural income are insig-
nificant at less than 10% level when modelling the choice of the farmers’ early retire-
ment system and interaction of northern location and forest area when modelling farm 
transfer. 
 
Among other most significant factors influencing probability of choosing the farmer’s 
early retirement pension is the age of the spouse. Contradicting separate probit models, 
an increase in farmers’ ages decreases and an increase in spouses’ ages increases the 
probability of transferring the farm to a new entrant when choosing the farmers’ early 
retirement pension. Likewise, the bivariate results suggest that livestock farms are less 
 18 
likely transferred to a new entrant contradicting earlier results based on separate probit 
models. 
 
In addition, off-farm income decreases farm transfer probability. This again contradicts 
the results obtained by separate probit models. Choosing farmers’ early retirement pen-
sion increases the farm transfer probability and it is strongly significant at the less than 
1% level of significance. 
 
B. Non-early retirement – continued farming model 
 
The likelihood of continuing to farm is higher than the likelihood to choose an old-age 
or other form of pension concerning farms not choosing the farmers’ early retirement 
pension. The estimated correlation coefficient (ρ=0.419) is positive but not significantly 
different from zero at 10% or higher level of significance, interpreted as there being no 
significant dependency between these two decisions and that they can be estimated in-
dependently. Although, due to the nature of the decision processes, a joint estimation is 
still feasible, it does not enhance the efficiency of the estimates.  
 
Most of the parameter estimates for not choosing the early retirement system are statis-
tically significant at the less than 10% level. The only exceptions are the farmer’s age, 
the forest area and share of barley subsidy of agricultural income. From the parameter 
estimates for continuing to farm, the number of children, the age of the oldest child, the 
agricultural and forest area, the share of barley subsidy of agricultural income and the 
interaction terms for agricultural land in the South, and the forest area in the North are 
insignificant at any reasonable levels of significance. 
 
Among the most significant parameter estimates for not choosing the farmers’ early 
retirement system is the age of the spouse and for continuing to farm, the age of the 
farmer, which corresponds to the results of the separate probit models. Signs for the 
estimated parameters for not choosing the farmers’ early retirement pension are natu-
rally opposite to those estimated in first probit model for choosing farmers’ early re-
tirement pension (Model 1 on Table 3).  
 
Contrary to the separate probit model estimated earlier (Model 3 in Table 3), an increas-
ing number of children and agricultural area decreases the probability of continuing to 
farm when a farmer does not choose the farmers’ early retirement system. This might be 
the case because farmers prefer successions rather than other early retirement schemes. 
Otherwise, the bivariate parameter estimates for continuing to farm (Table 5) have the 
same signs as those estimated by univariate probit model (Model 3 on Table 3). 
 
In summary, the results presented above suggest that the decision of not choosing the 
farmers’ early retirement pension increases the probability of continuing to farm and is 
highly significant at the less than 1% level.  
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Table 5. Parameter estimates for bivariate probit models. 
 
  
Early retirement –  
farm transfer 
No early retirement – 
continued farming 
  
Early  
retirement Transfer Non-retired Continued 
     
Constant 0.1006 d  - 0.7631 b  - 
Fage /10  -0.2330 a  -0.4178 a 0.0806 d  -1.6281 a 
Sage /10 0.1445 a 0.1006 a  -0.1437 a  -1.7572 a 
Spouse  -  -  - 12.1041 a 
Ffarmage /10 0.1232 a 0.1038 a  -0.1137 a  -0.0964 a 
Children 0.0512 a 0.1002 a  -0.0511 a  -0.0001 d 
Childage /10  - 0.1767 a  -  -0.0277 d 
Land /10 0.4696 a 0.5002 a  -0.4585 a  -0.0059 d 
Forest /10  -0.0082 d 0.0201 a 0.0069 d 0.0063 d 
Livestock  -0.2358 a  -0.1672 a 0.2193 a 0.1029 c 
North  -0.6767 a  -0.5732 b 0.5932 a  -0.2462 c 
Trend  -0.0713 a  -0.1379 a 0.0776 a 0.2487 a 
Xreplace, log 0.0132 b  -  -0.0305 a  - 
Xagrincome, log  -0.0628 a  -0.1042 a 0.0737 a 0.0330 a 
Xoffincome, log  -0.0403 a  -0.0286 a 0.0348 a 0.0209 b 
Sshare  -0.1079 d  -1.066 a 0.0852 d 0.0125 d 
Southland  -0.3102 a  -0.2775 b 0.3019 a 0.0029 d 
Northforest 0.0213 b 0.0019 d  -0.0163 c 0.0022 d 
Early retirement pension  - 0.4785 a  -  - 
No early retirement pension  -  -  - 7.9039 a 
Disturbance correlation  0.9898 a  0.4189 d 
          
Model performance:     
 Log-likelihood   -3,069.581   -3,981.606 
 Number of 0/1 observations  4,614/1,164 516/648 1,164/4,614 2,292/2,322 
 Total number of observations 5,778 1,164 5,778 4,614 
 
Note: Significant at the less than 1% (a), 1-5% (b), 5-10% (c), and more than 10% (d) levels insignificant. 
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Table 6. Predicted and observed probabilities based on bivariate probit models. 
 
  Model Farm transfer       
Cases Observations 0 % 1 % Total % 
No early Observed 4,614 79.9 0 0 4,614 79.9 
retirement Predicted 5,585 96.6 0 0 5,585 96.6 
pension        
        
Early Observed 516  8.9 648  11.2 1,164  20.1 
retirement Predicted 17 0.3 176  3.1 193  3.4 
pension        
        
Total Observed 5,130 88.8 648  11.2 5,778 100 
 Predicted 5,602 96.9 176  3.1 5,778 100 
        
  Model Continue farming     
Cases Observations 0 % 1 % Total % 
No early Observed 2,292 39.7 2322 40.2 4,614 79.9 
retirement Predicted 3,406 58.9 1994 34.5 5,400 93.4 
pension        
        
Early Observed 1,164  20.1 0 0 1,164  20.1 
retirement Predicted 304  5.3 74  1.3 378   6.6 
pension        
        
Total Observed 3,456 59.8 2322 40.2 5,778 100 
 Predicted 3,710 64.2 2069 35.8 5,778 100 
                
 
 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper analyses the effects of farm and farm family characteristics, economic incen-
tives and off-farm income on farming couple’s retirement decisions and their choices of 
pension system. The existing pension systems available are broadly divided into farm-
ers’ early retirement system and to all other forms of normal retirement. In addition to 
the choice of early retirement, the farming couple may continue farming.  
 
The choice of the farmers’ early retirement system is further divided into farm transfers 
to a new entrant and farm closures. This study is distinguished from earlier similar stud-
ies by focusing on farms as units, rather than on farmers, as is the case in many earlier 
studies. This is partly because of the restrictions involved with farmers’ early retirement 
systems, according to which when one of the farming couple retires a decision to trans-
fer or close down the farm concerns all the farming activities. And on the contrary, ac-
cording to the schemes one of the spouses may continue farming, although the other one 
retires involuntarily or by means of other pension schemes. The analysis presented here 
is based on univariate probit and bivariate probit models.  
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When comparing farms which chose the farmers’ early retirement pension with those 
which did not, we find that in the former case farmers and spouses are slightly older, 
operate the farm jointly and they have more and older children than the latter case. The 
farms run by those choosing the early retirement pension also are to some extent larger 
than other farms in the sample measured by the size of arable land and forest area. 
Among other characteristics of farms choosing the early retirement system, we notice 
that they are also more often located in southern parts of the country and are less likely 
livestock farms. Because of having a relatively higher agricultural income than other 
farms, also the income loss is more pronounced. These farms also have smaller off-farm 
income than other farms in the sample.  
 
The results in general support the earlier findings that after first increasing, the probabil-
ity of retiring by means of the farmers’ early retirement scheme decreases according to 
the farmer’s age. However, farmers’ early retirement is an increasing function of the age 
of the spouse. Also, the bigger the farm and the longer farmer has been farming, the 
more likely early retirement is. Choosing the farmers’ early retirement system is more 
likely in southern parts of the country and on non-livestock farms. The increase in both 
farm and off-farm income decreases the early retirement probability as well. 
 
Once a farmer has chosen the farmers’ early retirement system, the larger the farm, the 
higher is the likelihood that the farm is transferred and less likely closed down. The 
farm transfer is more likely also on those farms having more children and an increasing 
function of the age of the oldest child. Both these findings are consistent with earlier 
results. Farm closure is more likely in the northern parts of the country and the smaller 
the farm income is. Also, the share of barley subsidy of farm income increases the prob-
ability of farm closure and decreases the probability of farm transfer.  
 
Among those farming couples not choosing the farmers’ early retirement pension, the 
older the farming couple, and the longer the farmer has been farming the more likely 
they will choose some other pension scheme. Also, the existence of a possible successor 
at an optimal age increases their retirement probability. In northern parts of the country, 
farmers are also less likely to continue farming. 
 
The results of bivariate probit models where two successive decisions are jointly esti-
mated suggest that the choice of the farmers’ early retirement system and the transfer of 
farm to a new entrant are dependent of each other, but there is no dependency between 
not choosing the farmers’ early retirement pension and the continuation of farming. 
Choosing the farmers’ early retirement system also increases the farm transfer probabil-
ity and not choosing farmers’ early retirement pension increases the probability of con-
tinuing to farm.  
 
Unlike the results obtained from univariate models, an increasing farmer’s age de-
creases transfer probability, while an increasing spouse’s age increases the transfer 
probability when choosing the farmers’ early retirement pension. In addition, non-
livestock farms are more likely transferred to a new entrant when an early retirement 
pension is chosen. 
 
Also, the effect of off-farm income differs between univariate probit and bivariate pro-
bit model results. The univariate probit model’s results suggest that off-farm income 
decreases the probability of choosing the farmers’ early retirement system but increases 
the probability of farm transfer. The bivariate probit models results indicate that off-
 22 
farm income decreases both probability of choosing the early retirement pension and of 
transferring the farm to a new entrant. The latter result is in accordance with earlier 
studies suggesting that off-farm income and part-time farming accelerate farm exits. 
 
One reason for the difference between univariate and bivariate probit results is the way 
of constructing the model. In the univariate probit models for choosing early retirement 
and transferring the farm to a new entrant, both these choices are modelled separately 
being unconditional of each other which is not the case in the bivariate model. Also, a 
dummy variable indicating choice of early retirement is not included in the univariate 
probit model as an independent variable, whereas in the bivariate model the choice vari-
able is found to be highly significant in explaining farm transfer probability. The num-
ber of observations is also different. In the univariate probit model for farm transfer, the 
observations included in to the analysis are those choosing the farmers’ early retirement 
scheme, whereas in the bivariate model for choosing the early retirement scheme and 
the farm transfer, all observations in the data set are included in the analysis. The model 
performance also clearly indicates that these two decisions are to be estimated jointly 
rather than separately. 
 
In summary, the study results in the identification of important factors in the decision of 
choosing to retire early and the subsequent decision regarding the transfer or the cessa-
tion farm operations. Despite some variations in significance and effects of each factor, 
the ages of the farmer, the spouse and the oldest child, the number of potential succes-
sors, farm size, the location of the farm, off-farm earnings and crop subsidy together 
with income loss are found to be the most important determinants of the early retire-
ment and transfer or closure of farms. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Number of insured farms and farmers a, total field area and average farm size of insured farms 
and number of farms on which farmers have exited farming after the farmers’ early retirement 
schemes in 1974-2003 (Mela, 2004). 
 
 Number Number Land      Farms involved 
 of insured of insured million Average size in the early 
 farms farmers ha ha/farm ret. system 
1974 193,231 303,761  2.06  10.7 194 
1975 185,550 286,874  2.02  10.9 2,053 
1976 178,296 274,716  1.99  11.2 1,783 
1977 171,535 261,684  1.98  11.5 5,913 
1978 165,272 252,463  1.97  11.9 1,418 
1979 160,350 244,017  1.96  12.2 1,431 
1980 155,563 235,663  1.98  12.7 1,828 
1981 151,590 228,822  1.97  13.0 1,830 
1982 146,461 221,287  1.96  13.4 1,881 
1983 142,276 215,158  1.95  13.7 2,170 
1984 139,615 210,402  1.97  14.1 1,946 
1985 135,436 203,843  1.95  14.4 2,387 
1986 129,865 195,278  1.93  16.0 2,438 
1987 125,262 188,483  1.93  16.7 7,523 
1988 120,986 181,752  1.91  16.9 4,940 
1989 117,296 175,970  1.90  17.3 2,728 
1990 113,109 169,894  1.92  17.7 2,507 
1991 108,649 164,285  1.94  18.9 2,681 
1992 105,581 159,007  1.90  29.2 4,941 
1993 102,218 153,358  1.86  19.6 3,586 
1994 96,205 143,816  1.84  20.2 1,379 
1995 91,374 135,624  1.80  20.8 1,211 
1996 86,090 126,475  1.77  21.7 1,309 
1997 82,175 120,372  1.78  22.8 1,086 
1998 78,172 114,205  1.79  24.2 1,111 
1999 73,862 107,097  1.79  25.6 1,761 
2000 70,326 102,244  1.80  27.0 817 
2001 67,826 98,478  1.82  28.2 745 
2002 65,746 95,158  1.86  29.6 808 
2003 63,179 91,191  1.86  31.0 604 
a   Purchasing pension insurance from the Farmers’ Social Insurance Institution (Mela) is in 
practice obligatory for all farmers. It is also a pre-condition for applying a farmer’s early 
retirement pension after the scheme. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Development of number of insured farms (V1) and farmers (V2), total field area million ha  
(V3) and average farm size (V4) of insured farms and number of farms on which farmers have 
exited farming after the farmers’ early retirement schemes (V5) in 1974-2003 as an index. Base 
year is 1974, except for the V5 base year is 1975. Base year is normalised to 100. V1 is 193,231 
in 1974, V2 is 303,761 in 1974, V3 is 2.06 in 1974, V4 is 10.7 in 1974 and V5 is 2,053 in 1975 
(Mela, 2004). 
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